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RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS IN MississiPPi ADOPTIONS
Kimberly L. Loden
I. INTRODUCTION
A young teenage girl becomes pregnant. She realizes that she lacks the maturi-
ty and financial means to raise a child. She also realizes that a stigma will be
attached to a child born to a single teenage mother in a small Mississippi town.
After agonizingly weighing her options, she makes the decision to put her child
up for adoption. The child is adopted by a couple who have no children of their
own and are thrilled to be able to provide a loving home for their new child.'
Until recently, the story ended there, and the mother, adoptive parents and
child could live happily ever after. In 1972, however, the Supreme Court began
to hand down a line of decisions that injected a new party into the story. The
unwed biological father, previously ignored in the legal proceedings surrounding
the adoption of a child of an unwed mother, was declared to have constitutional-
ly protected rights in certain situations. These rights included the right to notice
of the adoption, and the right to prevent the adoption by withholding his consent.
By protecting the unwed father's parental rights, however, the Court's decisions
have also injected an element of uncertainty into the adoption process.
II. MississIPPI CASES
In 1998, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided two cases that dramatically
affected the certainty of the fate of adopted children and their families in
Mississippi. The cases dealt with the rights of unwed fathers who are not parties
to the adoption of their children.2
A. Humphrey v. Pannell
Tryxie Lynn Pannell was the biological daughter of a married woman and a
man who was not her mother's husband.' Her maternal grandparents, J.R. and
Winnifred Pannell, adopted her without notice to Larry Joe Humphrey, her bio-
logical father." Although Humphrey knew that Tryxie was his daughter, he made
no effort to support her, nor did he challenge her adoption by the Pannells at the
time of the adoption.'
Five years later, however, Humphrey challenged the adoption and sought cus-
tody of Tryxie.6 Humphrey and the Pannells reached a voluntary agreement,
entered by the chancellor as an Agreed Decree, which recognized that the court
did not know all relevant facts at the time of the adoption, because Humphrey
had not been identified as Tryxie's father.7 The decree then modified the Final
1. See Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d490 (Miss. 1998).
2. Malouf 722 So. 2d at 490; See Humphrey v. Pannell, 710 So. 2d 392 (Miss. 1998).
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Decree of Adoption by recognizing that Humphrey was the child's natural father
and that his parental rights were not terminated.' Humphrey not only recognized
the adoption of Tryxie by the Pannells, he also agreed to pay child support. In
exchange, he was granted visitation rights.'
Within the next two years, the parties repeatedly returned to the court for mod-
ification of the order.'" Humphrey first sought greater visitation, which the court
granted.1' The Pannells then sought to restrict Humphrey's visitation. 2 In
response, Humphrey sought custody, citing the Pannells' advanced age and poor
health as changes in circumstances that would justify modification of the
decree. 3 The chancellor found no material change in circumstances, and the
Pannells retained custody while Humphrey enjoyed liberal visitation.'
A few months later, Humphrey filed a motion to set aside the adoption."5 The
chancellor denied the motion and also denied his request for modification of cus-
tody." He then ordered Humphrey to pay an arrearage in child support."
Humphrey appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 8
B. Smith v. Malouf
In May, 1989, Joey Smith and Natalie Malouf, teenagers in Greenwood
Mississippi 9, began dating.2" In August, 1991, Natalie informed Joey that she
was pregnant with his child.2 Joey asked Natalie to marry him, but Natalie
refused.22 Natalie and Joey discussed their options, then told their parents that
Natalie was pregnant.23 Natalie's parents, the Maloufs, decided that the child
should be put up for adoption.2" Joey's parents, the Smiths, opposed putting the
child up for adoption, and offered to raise the child. The Maloufs refused to con-
sider allowing the Smiths to raise the child.2"
Soon after these conversations, Natalie and Joey ended their relationship.2" In
September, Natalie broke off all contact with Joey.27 Joey contacted an attorney
but took no formal legal action at that time.28 In December, Joey and his parents
visited Natalie in school in Indiana, and according to the Maloufs, they "bad-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 393-94.






16. Id. at 395.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 503 (Miss. 1998).
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gered" Natalie about the adoption. 9 In January, 1992, the Maloufs informed
Joey that Natalie was gone and would not return until the child was born."
Within the next three months, Natalie traveled all over the United States and in
Europe in order to prevent Joey from finding her. 1 Joey initiated legal proceed-
ings in chancery court, seeking a declaration of paternity, custody, and an injunc-
tion against the adoption proceedings. In March, Joey obtained a temporary
restraining order, which was served on Natalie by her father.3 He then obtained
a permanent injunction restraining Natalie and "all who might assist her" from
proceeding with the adoption. 4 Joey mailed a copy of this order to all the Vital
Statistics offices in Mississippi and to some offices in other states.35 He then
hired investigators to find Natalie.3
In April, Natalie called Joey from Georgia to inform him of the imminent birth
of their child. 7 Joey traveled to Georgia and retained an attorney, but Natalie
was already gone.38 Natalie, her parents, and the child traveled to California,
where the child was adopted by Canadian parents. 9 The Smiths sued the
Maloufs in circuit court alleging civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.4 The adoption by the Canadian family was put on hold until
the Mississippi action was resolved."' The circuit court granted the Maloufs'
motion to dismiss, and the Smiths appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.42
III. RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS
A. Constitutional Background
Under common law, an unwed father had no rights as a parent 3, largely because
it was almost impossible to prove paternity. Parental rights of unwed fathers were
not recognized until 1972 in Stanley v. Illinois.44 In Stanley, the unwed father and
mother lived together (intermittently) for eighteen years. 5 When the mother died,
the state removed the couple's children from the custody of the father 6 in accor-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 510.









41. Id at 493.
42. Id
43. David D. Myers, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father 41 Aiuz. L.
REv. 753, 758 (1999).
44. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
45. Id. at 646.
46. Id. "Shortly after the mother's death, [Stanley] placed the children in the care of Mr. and Mrs. Ness, who
took the children into their home. The record is silent as to whether the Ness household was an approved foster
home. Through Stanley's act, then, the Nesses were already the actual custodians of the children. At the
dependency proceeding, he resisted only the court's designation of the Nesses as the legal custodians; he did
not challenge their suitability for that role, nor did he seek for himself either that role or any other role that
would have imposed legal responsibility upon him." Id. at 663 n.2 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dance with a state statute providing that children of unwed fathers become wards
of the state upon the death of the mother.47 The Court agreed with the father that
the state denied the father due process by depriving him of his children without a
hearing to determine his fitness.' In reaching this decision, the Court explained,
[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements."4
The Court also held that because married fathers and all mothers could not be
deprived of their children without a showing of unfitness, the statute unconstitu-
tionally deprived Stanley of equal protection." In short, all parents, including
unwed fathers, are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before
their children are removed from their custody."
Several differences exist between the situation in Stanley and the situation in
Malouf The most important distinction, however, is that while Stanley dealt
with a situation in which the father had custody of his children before the mother
died, Joey Smith never saw his child before Natalie Malouf gave the child up for
adoption. Within the next decade, three cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court more clearly defined and, to a certain extent, limited the parental
rights of unwed fathers whose children were placed for adoption by the mother.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 2 the Court held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by applying a "best interest of the child"
standard if the father never had or sought custody of the child and had estab-
lished no relationship with the child." The child in Quilloin was born in 1964
and was in the sole custody of his mother.54 When the child was eleven years
old, his mother's husband petitioned to adopt the child. The natural father tried
to block the adoption and obtain visitation rights.56 He did not, however, attempt
to gain custody of the child, nor did he object to the child remaining in the home
of his mother and stepfather. 7 The adoption was granted over the father's
appeal, even though the father was never found to be an unfit parent.58 The
Supreme Court affirmed. 9
47. Id. at 646.
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) [Frankfurter, J., concurring]).
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id.
52. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
53. Id. at 254-55.





59. Id. at 256.
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We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State
were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of
the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest." But
this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or
legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption
would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never
before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recog-
nition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned,
except appellant. Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say
that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child."6
In addition to holding that the father's due process rights were not violated, the
Quilloin court also held that the father's right to equal protection of the law was
not violated. 1 The father in Quilloin argued that under the Georgia statute he, as
an unwed father, was treated differently than a divorced father. 2 The statute pro-
vided a divorced father with an absolute right to veto the adoption, while an
unwed father could only veto the adoption if he had "legitimated" the child.6
The Court held that the state was not foreclosed from recognizing the difference
in the extent of commitment to a child's welfare between an unwed father, who
had never shouldered any significant responsibility for the child's rearing, and a
divorced father, who at least had borne full responsibility for the child's rearing
during the marriage. 4
Although appellant was subject, for the years prior to these proceedings, to
essentially the same child-support obligation as a married father would have had
... he has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervi-
sion, education, protection, or care of the child. Appellant does not complain of
his exemption from these responsibilities and, indeed, he does not even now
seek custody of his child. In contrast, legal custody of children is, of course, a
central aspect of the marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has
broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children
during the period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the State was
not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the extent of commitment to
the welfare of the child."
Conversely, in Caban v. Mohammed,6 the Supreme Court held that the unwed
father had been denied equal protection under a New York statute that allowed an
unwed mother to block an adoption by withholding consent, but denied the same
60. Id. at 255 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-
63, (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).
61. Id. at 256.
62. Id. at 252.
63. Id. at 248-49.
64. Id. at 256.
65. Id. at 256.
66. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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right to an unwed father. 7 Caban involved an unwed father who had lived with
the mother of the children for five years.68 He was identified as the father on the
birth certificates of his two children. 69 Nevertheless, the Surrogate Court in New
York granted the petition of the mother's husband to adopt the children, termi-
nating all rights of the unwed father, who was never found to be an unfit parent.70
Under New York law, a putative father's consent was not necessary to an adop-
tion, although the father was allowed to object to the adoption.71 The court con-
sidered only the qualifications of the adoptive parents in deciding to allow the
adoption over the objection of the natural father.72
The United States Supreme Court held that the New York statute violated equal
protection by drawing a distinction between the adoption rights of unwed fathers
and those of other parents.73 The statute required consent to adoption by both par-
ents of a child born in wedlock, but only by the mother of a child born out of
wedlock.7" Absent abandonment or voluntary termination of parental rights, an
unwed mother had the ability to block the adoption simply by withholding con-
sent.7" The unwed father was denied such a right, even when his relationship with
the child was substantial.76 He was allowed to prevent the termination of his
parental rights only by showing that the best interests of the child would not per-
mit the child's adoption by the petitioning couple.77 The Supreme Court stated,
[c]ontrary to appellees' argument and to the apparent presumption underlying
§ 111, maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.
Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their new-
born infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would
become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the
child increased. The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have a
relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother .... We
reject, therefore, the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction of § 111 is
required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at
every phase of a child's development.78
The Court concluded that a distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption is at issue, did not bear a
"substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests," and thus violated the
unwed father's right to equal protection.
79
67. Id. at 382.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 383-84.
71. Id. at 384.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 382.
74. Id. at 385-87.
75. Id. at 385-86.
76. Id. at 386-87.
77. Id. at 387.
78. Id. at 389.
79. Id. at 394.
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Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson, the Supreme Court held that where the putative
father never established a substantial relationship with the child, lack of notice is
not a violation of due process or equal protection if the putative father could
have received notice by mailing a postcard to the state's Putative Father
Registry.8" In Lehr, the unwed father had "never supported and rarely seen" the
child in the two years following her birth.8" Nevertheless, he objected when the
mother's husband adopted the child.82 Once again, a New York statute regarding
the rights of unwed fathers was challenged as unconstitutional, but this time the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the state court. 83
The State of New York maintains a "putative father registry." A man who files
with that registry demonstrates his intent to claim paternity of a child born out
of wedlock and is therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt
that child. Before entering Jessica's adoption order, the Ulster County Family
Court had the putative father registry examined. Although appellant claims to
be Jessica's natural father, he had not entered his name in the registry.84
In Lehr, the Court explained that, under the New York statute, the unwed
father's right to receive notice was completely within the father's control.8" The
statute provided a procedure whereby, the father may guarantee that he receive
notice of any proceeding to adopt the child by mailing a postcard to the putative
father registry.8"
The Court held that there was a significant and clear difference between the
parent-child relationship in Stanley and Caban and the "potential relationship" in
Quilloin and Lehr.87
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. At that point, it may be said that he "act[s] as a father
toward his children." But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor
sever genetic bonds. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the indi-
viduals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'pro-
mot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children... as well as from
the fact of blood relationship."
80. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
81. Id. at 249-50.
82. Id. at 250.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 250-51.
85. Id. at 264.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 261-62.
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The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsi-
bility for the childs future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child rela-
tionship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development.
If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a
State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.'
The Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state
from according different treatment to a parent who has established a relationship
with his or her child and one who has not.as
Although not an adoption case, Michael H. v. Gerald D.9" also involves the
rights of an unwed father. The case involved a California statute providing that a
child born to a married woman living with her husband is presumed to be the
child of the marriage.9 ' Only the husband or wife, not a third party may rebut the
presumption (even if the third party is the actual father of the child). 2
The natural father,93 Michael H., filed an action to establish his paternity and
right to visitation. 4 The Supreme Court held that the California statute did not
violate the father's right to due process." Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
said that Michael H. failed to prove that his liberty interest in his relationship
with his child was an interest "so deeply embedded within our traditions as to be
a fundamental right."96 Scalia explained that society has historically protected
the marital family against claims by third persons.97
Taken together, these cases clearly do not provide constitutional protection for
all unwed fathers whose children are adopted without notice or consent. They
do, however, protect fathers who have taken substantial steps to establish a rela-
tionship with their children. Clearly, a statute that declares an unwed father a
non-parent for adoption proceedings is unconstitutional when the father who has
established a relationship with his child and is an otherwise fit parent.
B. Mississippi Statutory Scheme
Section 93-17-5 of the Mississippi Code provides that the parents of a child
placed for adoption must file a consent to the adoption, not before seventy-two
hours after the birth of the child. In 1998, the statute was amended to provide
that
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 267-68.
90. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
91. Id. at 113 (citing Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621 (West Supp. 1989)).
92. Id.
93. Blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that Michael H, not the mother's husband, was the child's
father, and the mother signed a stipulation to the fact, although it was never filed. Id. at 114-15.
94. Id. at 114.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 125.
97. Id. at 124.
98. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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In the case of a child born out of wedlock, the father shall not have a right to
object to an adoption unless he has demonstrated, within the period ending thir-
ty days after the birth of the child, a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood. Determination of the rights of the father of a child born out of
wedlock may be made in proceedings pursuant to a Petition for Determination
of Rights as provided in Section 93-17-6."9
Also in 1998, section 93-17-6 was added to the Mississippi Code as a means of
protecting unwed fathers. Section 93-17-6 provided for a petition for determina-
tion of rights."' The statute allowed a person alleged or claiming to be the father
of a child born out of wedlock who was put up for adoption to file a petition
within thirty days after the child's birth. 1 The sole purpose of the hearing was
to determine whether the father had a right to object to the adoption.0 2 The
father must present proof of his "full commitment to the responsibilities of par-
enthood" by establishing that he either
(a) Provided financial support, including, but not limited to, the payment of
consistent support to the mother during her pregnancy, contributions to the pay-
ment of the medical expenses of pregnancy and birth, and contributions of con-
sistent support of the child after birth; that he frequently and consistently visited
the child after birth, and that he is now willing and able to assume legal and
physical care of the child; or
(b) Was willing to provide such support and to visit the child and that he made
reasonable attempts to manifest such a parental commitment, but was thwarted
in his efforts by the mother or her agents, and that he is now willing and able to
assume legal and physical care of the child. 103
If the father failed to prove that he had met these responsibilities his rights
would be terminated, and he would have no right to object to the adoption."0
However, at the time Joey Smith and Larry Humphrey's children were born,
the Mississippi adoption statute was very different. Section 93-17-5(3) read,
"[i]n the case of a child born out of wedlock, the father shall not be deemed to be
a parent for the purpose of this chapter, and no reference shall be made to the
illegitimacy of such child."'05 The unwed father had no rights with regard to the
child because, section 93-17-6, which now provides for a petition for determina-
tion of rights, did not exist. Both section 93-17-6 and the 1998 amendment to
section 93-17-5 expired by their terms on July 1, 2001, and Mississippi's statuto-
99. Id.





105. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1994).
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ry scheme reverted to the language that was in place at the time that Joey Smith
and Natalie Malouf's child was born. At this time, the state's law on the rights
of unwed fathers is based solely on the decisions of the state Supreme Court in




C. Humphrey and Malouf
In both Humphrey and Malouf, the Mississippi Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether and under what circumstances an unwed father in Mississippi
should be considered a parent for the purpose of providing consent to an adoption.
The two fathers presented the court with extremely different circumstances, and
the court therefore reached different conclusions in the two cases. However, both
decisions recognized an important fact: the Mississippi statute, as it was written
at the time these children were adopted, was undeniably unconstitutional. 7
Larry Humphrey provided no support for his daughter during the seven months
between her birth and her adoption by the Pannells, in spite of the fact that he
was aware that she was his child.0 8 In fact, Tryxie was five years old before
Humphrey made any effort to establish any legal ties to his daughter, or to take
any responsibility for her welfare. 9 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's denial of Humphrey's
motion to set aside the adoption.1
Joey Smith, on the other hand, spent the months of Natalie Malouf's pregnan-
cy doing everything within his power to avoid losing his child. He was prevent-
ed, however, from establishing a relationship with the child when Natalie gave
the child up for adoption to a Canadian couple."
The court examined the United States Supreme Court cases referred to
above." 2 These cases provide constitutional protection for the rights of unwed
fathers who have "grasped the opportunity" to establish a relationship with their
children.113 The Mississippi court, like the courts in most states faced with simi-
lar situations,1 ' extended this protection to fathers who are prevented from
establishing this relationship because the child was adopted immediately after
birth." ' To be entitled to this protection,
106. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (West Supp. 2000).
107. Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 493 (Miss. 1998); See Humphrey v. Pannell, 710 So. 2d 392 (Miss.
1998).
108. Humphrey, 710 So. 2d at 393.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 398.
111. Malouf 722 So. 2d at 492.
112. Id. at 494-95 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
113. Id. at 495.
114. See Myers, supra note 43, at 768 (citing In re Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1162-63 (D.C. 1990); In
re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990); In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 91 (S.D. 1996);
Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 747-50 (W. Va. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1035 (1999)).
115. Malouf 722 So. 2d at 497.
[VOL. 21:25
Rights of Unwed Fathers in Mississippi Adoptions
the unwed father must come forward to immediately assume parental responsi-
bilities and he must do so in a prompt and substantial manner, including public
acknowledgement of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps
taken to establish legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a
commitment to the child. Any unfitness, waiver or abandonment on the part of
the father works to his detriment.116
Joey Smith met this burden of proof. First he asked the child's mother to
marry him. 17 When she refused, he told her he wanted to keep the child and
offered financial support.11 When the Maloufs decided not to keep the child,
Joey repeatedly asked them to give the child to him. 19 When Natalie and her
mother began travelling around the country to avoid Joey, he filed a declaration
of paternity, obtained an injunction to prevent the adoption, and hired private
investigators to locate Natalie. 2 ' The court said that Joey had "'grasp[ed] every
opportunity' to manifest and establish a relationship with his child. 121 The court
held that "Joey had a constitutional right to be notified of or to withhold his con-
sent to the adoption of his child in light of his substantial and prompt attempts to
establish a relationship with his child."
' 22
IV. THE REMEDY
Under Smith v. Malouf, as well as the current version of section 93-17-5 of the
Mississippi Code, an unwed father that has established (or grasped every oppor-
tunity to establish) a relationship with his child is a parent who must be made a
party to a valid adoption.1 23 Unfortunately, many circumstances exist in which
this right may not be recognized until the child has already been adopted. Joey
Smith's situation provides one example of such a circumstance: the child's
mother fled to another state in order to place the child with an adoptive family.
Another example is a situation in which the father does not find out about the
child until after the child is adopted. In such a situation, what remedy is avail-
able to the unwed father?
A. Damages
In Smith v. Malouf, the Mississippi court had no power to affect the actual
adoption; the Canadian adoption was put on hold pending resolution of the
Mississippi action.1 24 However, the Mississippi courts did have the power to pro-
vide Joey Smith with damages.




120. Id. at 496-97.
121. Id. at 497.
122. Id.
123. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (West Supp. 2000); Malouf, 722 So. 2d at 497.
124. Malouf 722 So. 2d at 493.
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Joey Smith and his parents sued Natalie Malouf and her parents for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to prevent Joey from establishing
a relationship with his child.12 The circuit court held that Smith was limited to
seeking redress by resort to contempt proceedings in the chancery court.12
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, holding that Natalie and her parents
could be held liable for interfering with Joey's right to gain custody of his
child. 27 The court held that "[o]ne who claims emotional distress need only
show that the emotional trauma claimed was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the negligent or intentional act of another." '128
It is irrefutable that appellees' behavior was intentional and that the foreseeable
result of their actions was that the child would be adopted by strangers, thereby
depriving Joey of an opportunity to veto the adoption and vie for custody. It is
also axiomatic that any father-especially a father who has gone that "extra
mile" to gain custody of his child-would suffer severe emotional distress due to
the child he wanted being secretly placed for adoption.129
The court also held that if the Maloufs acted in concert to "unlawfully violate the
outstanding injunction and to deprive Joey of his lawful rights as natural parent
of the child," they could be held liable to Joey for civil conspiracy.
1 30
Although preferable to being deemed a non-parent, for the unwed father who
has been denied the right to be a parent to his child, the right to collect money
damages is a totally inadequate remedy. The father seeks to establish a relation-
ship with his child. Fortunately, other options exist.
B. Nullify the Adoption
Section 93-17-17 of the Mississippi Code provides,
For all purposes of this chapter, the chancery court shall be a court of general
jurisdiction and it is declared to be the public policy of the state that no adoption
proceedings shall be permitted to be set aside except for jurisdictional defects and
for failure to file and prosecute the same under the provisions of this chapter."'
In 1973, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided the case of Krohn v.
Migues 32 In Krohn, a child's biological mother instituted a habeas corpus
action to regain custody of her child from the child's adoptive mother." At the
125. Id. at 492.
126. Id. at 499.
127. Id. at 498-99.
128. Id. at 497. Malouf's tests for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress have been modi-
fied by the Mississippi Supreme Court. See Adams v. U.S. Homecrafters, 744 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999). The
new standard, however, is more lenient than the Malouf standard. Thus, this analysis of available remedies is
not changed by the new standard.
129. Malouf 722 So. 2d at 498.
130. Id. at 498. The court held, however, that Joey's parents, the Smiths, lacked standing to sue either Natalie
or the Maloufs, because grandparents have no constitutionally protected right to a relationship with their grand-
children.
131. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-17 (1994). (emphasis added)
132. Krohn v. Migues, 274 So. 2d 654 (Miss. 1973).
133. Id. at 655.
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time the child was born, the biological mother was married to a man who was
not the father of the child.134 The mother's husband was not made a party to the
adoption proceedings. 38 The court applied the presumption that a child born in
wedlock is the child of the mother's husband.136 The court said, the decree of
adoption was a nullity and could be attacked by the child's biological mother
because the child's legal father was not made a party to the adoption. 37
In Humphrey, the father was not allowed to challenge the adoption decree
because, as discussed above, he had not established a relationship with the child
and was therefore, not a necessary party to the adoption. 38 The court implied,
however, that if the father had established such a relationship (or, as in Malouf
had grasped the opportunity to do so), he would have been entitled to challenge
the adoption, even five years after the adoption had taken place. 39
While nullifying the adoption gives full recognition to the father's parental
rights and may be fully satisfactory for the father, the effect may be devastating
to the other parties involved, particularly if the child has lived with the adoptive
parents for an extended period of time. 4° The tragedy of such a remedy was
summed up in David D. Meyer's description of the outcome of a successful chal-
lenge to an Illinois adoption:
The last day of April 1995 had dawned just like any other for four-year-old
Richard Warburton. It was a Sunday, chilly and gray, a perfectly average day in
what passes for spring in suburban Chicago. By three o'clock that afternoon,
however, Richard was fighting desperately to cling to the fragments of his life
as they dissolved around him. Though his parents had told him a few hours ear-
lier that he would be going on a "sleep over" at the home of a family he did not
know, even at four years old he plainly sensed that something more life-altering
was about to take place. After all, the belongings of his childhood, the silver
bicycle with training wheels, his basketball, the blue toy box, his clothes, were
already neatly collected near the front curb and a crowd of reporters and neigh-
bors numbering into the hundreds had amassed on the front lawn. Inside the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 657.
137. Id. Although the biological mother in Krohn knew at the time of the adoption that her husband was not a
party to the proceedings, she was not estopped from challenging the adoption, because the adoptive mother also
knew that the legal father was not a party, and therefore had perpetrated a fraud upon the court. See also
Birindelli v. Egelston, 404 So. 2d 322, 324 (Miss. 1981).
138. See Humphrey v. Pannell, 710 So. 2d 392, 397 (Miss. 1998).
139. Id. at 397-98. Section 93-17-15 of the Mississippi Code establishes a six-month statute of limitations
for challenges to adoptions, whether by service or publication of process. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-15 (1994).
The court in Humphrey declined to decide whether this limitation would apply to an adoption void for lack of
jurisdiction. See Humphrey, 710 So. 2d at 400 n.6. However, the language of the statute seems clear that some
type of process must have been served in order for the statute of limitations to begin to run.
140. Joey Smith and Natalie Malouf's child was six-years-old when the case reached the Mississippi
Supreme Court.
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house, crying convulsively, oblivious to his national fame as the "Baby
Richard" caught up in a well-publicized custody battle, young Richard
Warburton pleaded with each member of his family to protect him. When his
mother, wracked with tears, was unable to answer, Richard turned next to his
father, and finally to his seven-year-old brother, begging each of them in turn to
come with him. "I'll be good," he sobbed, "Don't make me leave. I'll be
good."
Less than an hour later, after brief and awkward introductions to the biological
parents he had never met, Richard was carried out before the television cameras
and the weeping crowd to a waiting van. As he sobbed and clung to his adop-
tive mother, his heart racing and pounding against her chest, a family friend
gently pried his fingers from her neck and shoulders so that he could be wrested
into the hands of his biological father. With that, he was whisked away from all
he had known to join a new home and family. The mandate of the Illinois
Supreme Court that he be transferred to the custody of his biological parents
"forthwith" was fulfilled.141
C. Open Adoption
There is another possible solution to the dilemma of choosing between the
faultless father and the equally faultless adoptive parents-a solution that may
actually promote the best interests of the child, if not the adults. Several states,
in dealing with this problem, have recognized a form of "open adoption," in
which the adoptive parents remain the child's legal parents, but the biological
parent retains reduced, but not terminated, parental rights. 42 Currently, open
adoptions are recognized as voluntary agreements between the parties, although
one commentator has suggested that court-ordered open adoptions, without the
consent of all parties, would be preferable to other existing remedies. 43
The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized such an open adoption in
Humphrey.44 The agreement into which Humphrey and the Pannells entered
was typical of open adoptions: the biological parent recognizes the adoption and
provides child support in return for visitation rights. 4 The authority for this
type of agreement in Mississippi comes from a clause in section 93-17-13 of the
Mississippi Code, which states in part,
The final decree shall adjudicate, in addition to such other provisions as may be
found by the court to be proper for the protection of the interests of the child;
and its effect, unless otherwise specifically provided, shall be that . . . all
parental rights of the natural parent, or parents, shall be terminated, except as to
a natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent. 46
141. Myers, supra note 43, at 753-54.
142. Id. at 815.
143. Id. at 814-816.
144. Humphrey, 710 So. 2d at 400 (Miss. 1998).
145. Id. at 400-01.
146. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-13 (1994) (emphasis added).
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The court held that a decree could "otherwise specifically provide" that the
biological parent's parental rights were not entirely terminated.147 It then found
that the voluntary agreement between Humphrey and the Pannells, which provid-
ed for child support and visitation rights, was in the best interests of the child.'"
However, the court refused to go further by allowing the biological parent to
challenge the adoptive parents' custody. 4 9
It is clear, however, that a parent who is giving up a child for adoption or, as in
this case, acknowledging the validity of an adoption, can not retain all of his
parental rights or else the adoption is rendered meaningless. By allowing
Humphrey to argue that he should be granted custody based on this State's mod-
ification of parental custody law, the Chancellor in effect placed Humphrey on
near-equal footing with the Pannells as far as their right to custody of Tryxie is
concerned ....
If Humphrey had prevailed in demonstrating a "material change in circum-
stances" based on the preponderance of evidence standard, then he would pre-
sumably have been able to divest the Pannells of custody of their legal child.
Such a result comes dangerously close to terminating the Pannells' parental
rights on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard which was
rejected by this Court, the Legislature, and the U.S. Supreme Court. This pro-
ceedings [sic] in the present case were admittedly not termination of parental
rights proceedings, but the effect to an adoptive family of divesting them of cus-
tody of their child is sufficiently similar to raise valid constitutional concerns."'
In addition to this constitutional argument, the court expressed public policy con-
cems with the idea of allowing the biological parent to retain all parental rights.
The adoption statutes, according to the court, reflect a legislative intent to create
a new relationship between the adoptive parents and child which is not subject to
endless legal contests. The parent-child relationship, by its very nature, requires
stability and permanence, and the Legislature has clearly recognized this fact in
the adoption and termination of parental rights statutes of this State."'1
This court does conclude, however, that § 93-17-13 was not intended by the
Legislature to grant a natural parent the right to weaken the legal bonds of the
adoptive parent-child relationship by reserving the right to, in effect, sit and wait
for the circumstances of the adoptive family to materially change and then divest
the adoptive family of the custody of the child. The United States Supreme
Court, as noted earlier, has placed a high constitutional value on parental rights
which arise from caring and nurturing a child, and this value should also apply to
adoptive parents who have developed a relationship with a child.15
147. Humphrey, 710 So. 2d at 400.
148. Id. at 400-01.
149. Id. at 400.
150. Id. at 399.
151. Id. at 399-400.
152. Id. at 400.
2001]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Although the court upheld the child support and visitation clauses of the
Humphrey agreement, it expressed doubt about the wisdom of such agreements
in general."5 3 The court "consider[ed] it improper to incidentally rule upon the
propriety of post-adoption visitations in the present case, however, and we leave
a ruling on this important issue to future cases when the issue is squarely before
this Court." '154
In his concurrence, Justice Banks disagreed with the majority's assertion that
allowing the biological parent to retain substantial parental rights would dimin-
ish the rights of the adoptive parents. 55
An adoption bestows parental rights and obligations upon the adoptive parent or
parents. That fact is not diminished by a natural parent or parents retaining
equal rights any more than a natural mother's rights are diminished by the fact
that a natural father also may have rights whether or not the two were ever mar-
ried. The plain fact is that whenever those with parental rights are separated
from a child, choices have to be made concerning custody, visitation and sup-
port. As always, the paramount concern will be the best interest of the child.
Granting custody to one parent is not tantamount to termination of parental
rights as the majority suggests. An array of both rights and obligations remain.
These include, to name a few, the right to inherit, the right of reasonable visita-
tion (restricted only by what is in the best interest of the child), the residual
right to custody should there be a death of the custodial parent or a material
change in circumstances and the duty of support."5 '
In addition to the constant threat of litigation feared by the majority in
Humphrey, there are other major public policy concerns connected with the idea
of an open adoption. One concern is the likelihood that continuous involvement
of the biological parent in the child's life will threaten the child's relationship
with the adoptive parents and will detrimentally affect the child's emotional
development."7 One can argue, however, that the situation is not that different
from the typical split-family that children of divorced or unmarried parents face.
In short, while it is not the best situation for a child, open adoption may be
preferable to tearing the child away from the adoptive family he has become a
part of and placing the child in the sole custody of a father he has never known.
Another concern is that the possibility of ending up with an open adoption will
discourage prospective parents from deciding to adopt at all. Indeed, it is easy to
see how the possibility of fighting a biological parent's influence at every turn
and going to court every few months, as the parties in Humphrey did, could easi-
ly discourage people from adopting. Again, however, the effect is less dramatic




155. Id. at 402 (Banks, J., concurring in judgment).
156. Id.
157. Myers, supra note 43, at 829-30.
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The specter of losing custody to a late-appearing biological parent has seemed
to loom so large in recent years that observers have given a label to its impact
on adoptive families, "the Baby Richard factor." Even the perceived insecurity
of adoption has caused many prospective adoptive parents to reconsider adopt-
ing at all or to look overseas for adoptive children.15
In forming policy regarding open adoption, the legislature and the courts can
reduce this insecurity in two ways. First, as the majority in Humphrey under-
stood, while the biological parent retains some parental rights, the adoptive par-
ents should retain full decision-making authority with respect to the child, and
there should be no question about changes in custody except in extreme circum-
stances. Second, as Justice Banks explained in his dissent, "the retention of
parental rights in natural parents post-adoption will not and should not be the
norm." '159 The remedy should be available only where the adoptive parents and
child have bonded and the biological parent is able to validly challenge the adop-
tion on the grounds of lack of consent.
The sad fact is that when an unwed father who was not a party to the adoption
successfully challenges an adoption, no remedy will be entirely satisfactory for
all the parties. Both the father whose child has been taken from him unconstitu-
tionally and the adoptive parents who have made the child a part of their family
are innocent parties."' The best solution will depend, of course, on the facts of
each case, and the chancellor should always base his decision on the best interest
of the child. If the parties can agree, however, the open adoption arrangement
prevents the agonizing process of tearing a child away from the family he has
always known in order to place him with a father he has never seen. The open
adoption puts the child in an arrangement similar to that of any other child
whose parents are not married to each other. Open adoption is far from a perfect
solution, but it may be the best option available in these circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to be a parent is one of the most cherished rights protected by the
Constitution. In a society in which the term "deadbeat dad" has become a house-
hold word and a national concern, we intuitively bristle at the treatment of Joey
Smith, a young man who apparently was willing to accept full responsibility for
his child. At the same time, we sympathize with Natalie Malouf, who believed
that allowing her child to be raised in a stable, two-parent family far away from
the scandal that follows an unwed mother in a small town, would be in the best
interest of the child. Our hearts break for the adoptive parents who have made
this child a part of their family.
158. Id. at 797.
159. Humphrey, 710 So. 2d at 402 (Banks, J., concurring in judgment).
160. In his dissent in Smith v. Malouf Justice Mills suggests that the unwed father should not be allowed to
object to the adoption of his child on the grounds that the father is in a situation of his own making. See Smith
v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 511 (Miss. 1998) (Mills, J., dissenting). The same statement could be made about
the unwed mother, who has always been allowed to make the decision regarding adoption.
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The most tragic figure, however, is the child torn apart by the private war car-
ried on by the people who love him. Often, the parties feel that victory in this
war must be all or nothing: the child is tom away from the family he knows and
placed with a father he has never seen, or is allowed to stay with the adoptive
family but denied any chance of knowing a biological father who loves him but
was never given a chance to prove it. While open adoption may not be the best
answer in every situation, it is an alternative of which all the parties should be
aware, remembering that a real victory in this war will be a decision made in the
best interest of the child, not the best interest of the adults.
